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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
   
 
No. 17-2093 
   
 
DEBRA STEELE 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
PELMOR LABORATORIES, INC. 
__________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania  
(District Court No.: 2-16-cv-03088) 
District Judge: Honorable Legrome D. Davis 
__________________________ 
 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
on February 9, 2018 
 
 
Before: CHAGARES, SCIRICA, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Opinion filed:  March 13, 2018) 
 
   
 
O P I N I O N* 
___________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Debra Steele appeals the District Court’s order granting summary judgment in 
favor of Pelmor Laboratories on Steele’s Title VII and Pennsylvania Human Relations 
Act (“PHRA”) retaliation claims and on her wrongful discharge claim.  
We will affirm the District Court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of 
Pelmor on all claims. The District Court concluded that Steele established a prima facie 
case of retaliation under Title VII and the PHRA, but that she had not produced sufficient 
evidence to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Pelmor’s proffered explanation for 
her termination––restructuring and poor job performance––was a pretext for retaliation. 
We will affirm. Because a plaintiff must also demonstrate pretext in order to succeed on a 
wrongful discharge claim, Steele’s wrongful discharge claim fails as well.   
I. Background 
Debra Steele worked as a production manager at Pelmor Laboratories. In 
November 2013, Pelmor promoted Michael Wuensche to Vice President of Operations, 
making him Steele’s direct supervisor. Steele disagreed with several changes 
implemented by Wuensche. For example, she refused to prepare employee schedules four 
or five weeks in advance because she considered it a “waste of time.” A.45.  
In January and March of 2014, Wuensche sent Steele six emails regarding her 
failure to perform basic tasks such as scheduling employees and completing daily reports. 
In April 2014, Wuensche completed a performance review for Steele. He concluded that 
Steele’s overall job performance was “below expected” and “[met] only a few 
requirements.” A.234. He specifically noted Steele’s lack of communication with 
coworkers and her failure to create employee schedules more than a few days in advance. 
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Wuensche sent Steele four additional performance-related emails in May, July, and 
August of 2014.  
In September 2014, Steele filed a gender discrimination lawsuit against Pelmor. 
She alleged that Wuensche’s promotion constituted gender discrimination under Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 19641, the Equal Pay Act2, and the PHRA3. Steele v. Pelmor, 
No. 2:14-cv-5340 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 2014) (“Steele I”). Wuensche sent Steele two 
additional performance-related emails in October and November of 2014.  
In March 2015, Wuensche drafted a memo that suggested eliminating the 
production manager position and reassigning those duties to other employees to better 
utilize the company’s resources and improve the company’s overall performance. He 
stressed that Steele was unable to effectively blend in with Pelmor’s management 
practices and included an updated review of Steele’s performance. It indicated that her 
performance had not improved since the 2014 evaluation. Pelmor’s Human Resources 
Manager, Gerri Kovacic, turned Wuensche’s handwritten draft into a typed memo, which 
Wuensche signed.  
On April 29, 2015, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Pelmor in Steele’s gender discrimination lawsuit.  
On May 19, 2015, Wuensche emailed James Ross, Pelmor’s president, suggesting 
the “elimination and realignment” of various job duties. A.249. His suggestions included 
eliminating the production manager position. Ross approved the elimination of the 
                                              
1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3. 
2 29 U.S.C. § 206(d).  
3 43 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 955(d).  
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production manager position on May 26, 2015. He wrote: “I believe Pelmor can absorb 
those duties within the organization allowing us to gain more efficiencies, improve 
communication across departments, and reduce costs.” A.249.  
On the morning of May 29, 2015, Steele informed Human Resources that she 
wanted to file a worker’s compensation claim because she had developed a hernia. A few 
hours later, Pelmor told Steele that her employment was terminated due to company 
restructuring.. After she was terminated, Steele filed a Notice of Appeal in her gender 
discrimination lawsuit. May 29 was the last day Steele could have timely filed a Notice of 
Appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a) (requiring an appellant to file notice of appeal within 
thirty days of the district court’s entry of judgment). 
In June 2016, Steele filed the instant lawsuit against Pelmor, alleging that her 
termination constituted retaliation under Title VII, the PHRA, and Pennsylvania common 
law. Steele v. Pelmor Laboratories, Inc., No. 16-cv-3088, 2017 WL 5515919 (E.D.Pa. 
Apr. 18, 2017) (“Steele II”). Pelmor moved for summary judgment, arguing that Steele’s 
employment had been terminated due to company restructuring and her poor job 
performance. Steele II, at *4. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Pelmor on all claims. Id. at *5. This timely appeal followed. 
II. Standard of Review 
We exercise plenary review over a grant of summary judgment. Atkinson v. 
LaFayette Coll., 460 F.3d 447, 451 (3d Cir. 2006). Summary judgment is appropriate if 
there is no dispute of material fact as to “an element essential to the [non-moving] party’s 
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. 
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Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A dispute of fact is genuine if a reasonable jury could 
return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 
242, 248 (1986). 
III. Analysis4 
A. Title VII and PHRA Retaliation Claims 
We will affirm the District Court’s order granting summary judgment on Steele’s 
Title VII and PHRA retaliation claims because Steele has not produced sufficient 
evidence to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Pelmor’s proffered explanation for 
her termination––restructuring and poor job performance––was pretext for retaliation.  
We analyze retaliation claims arising under Title VII and the PHRA coextensively. 
Atkinson, 460 F.3d at 454 n.6. In the absence of direct evidence of retaliation, we 
evaluate both claims using the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 
F.3d 181, 193 (3d Cir. 2015).  
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff who brings a Title VII or 
PHRA retaliation claim must first establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Moore v. 
City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 340-41 (3d Cir. 2006). If the plaintiff establishes a 
prima facie case of retaliation, the burden shifts to the defendant to advance a legitimate, 
non-retaliatory reason for the adverse employment action. Carvalho-Grevious v. Del. 
                                              
4 The District Court had jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This Court 
has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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State Univ., 851 F.3d 249, 257 (3d Cir. 2017). The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff 
to prove that the defendant’s proffered reason is merely pretext for discrimination. Id.  
To survive summary judgment on the issue of pretext, a plaintiff must produce 
evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the employer’s proffered 
explanation is false and that retaliation was the real reason for the adverse employment 
action. Id. at 257-58. “[A]n inference [of pretext] based upon a speculation or conjecture 
does not create a material factual dispute sufficient to defeat [entry of] summary 
judgment.” Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 287 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Robertson v. 
Allied Signal, Inc., 914 F.2d 360, 382 n.12 (3d Cir. 1990)).  
 The District Court determined that Steele established a prima facie case of 
retaliation. We agree. However, Steele’s retaliation claim ultimately fails because she has 
not put forth sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Pelmor’s 
legitimate, non-discriminatory explanation for her termination––restructuring and poor 
job performance—was pretext for retaliation.  
Steele claims that a reasonable jury could conclude that Pelmor’s proffered 
explanation was pretext based on the “odd timing” of her termination and “numerous 
inconsistencies” in the record. Br. for Appellant at 5, 22. However, neither is sufficient to 
support a finding of pretext. Steele’s timing argument—that Pelmor waited to fire Steele 
on May 29 to prevent her from appealing the dismissal of her discrimination suit—fails 
because Steele was still free to appeal her discrimination suit. In fact, she filed her appeal 
after she was terminated.  
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Steele’s “inconsistencies” argument fares no better. “Pretext may be shown by 
exposing . . . weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or 
contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action.” Marra v. 
Phila. Hous. Auth., 497 F.3d 286, 306 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
(emphasis added). None of the inconsistencies identified by Steele relate to Pelmor’s 
proffered explanation for her termination. They are minor discrepancies on immaterial 
issues, and they all are consistent with Pelmor’s proffered reason for Steele’s termination. 
Even considered together, these minor inconsistencies are not sufficient to allow a 
reasonable jury to conclude that Pelmor’s explanation for Steele’s termination was 
pretext for retaliation.  
First, Steele points to Pelmor’s failure to produce the original typed March 2015 
memo, in which Wuensche first suggested eliminating the production manager position. 
According to Steele, this shows that the memo was fabricated to justify her termination. 
But Steele ignores the fact that Pelmor produced both the original hand-written memo 
and a duplicate of the typed memo. The original hand-written memo was identical to the 
typed version, and Kovacic testified as to the original typed memo’s authenticity at her 
deposition. See Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(1) (providing that a document can be authenticated 
by the testimony of a witness with knowledge). With regard to the duplicate of the typed 
memo,  “[a] duplicate is admissible to the same extent as the original unless a genuine 
question is raised about the original’s authenticity or the circumstances make it unfair to 
admit the duplicate.” Fed. R. Evid. 1003. Neither party raised a genuine question as to the 
8 
 
original memo’s authenticity. Therefore, Pelmor’s failure to produce the original typed 
March 2015 memo is immaterial.5  
The second inconsistency Steele points to is a minor disparity between Pelmor’s 
interrogatory answers and the deposition testimony of Rosemary Nugent, a Pelmor 
employee. According to Pelmor, Nugent took over one of Steele’s duties––interacting 
with temporary staffing companies. According to Pelmor, Wuensche, Kovacic, and a 
third employee assisted Nugent as needed. However, Nugent testified that she had not 
taken over Steele’s staffing duties. Instead, she testified, Wuensche and Kovacic were 
responsible for staffing after Steele’s termination. Id. This minor discrepancy does not 
support a finding of pretext. In fact, terminating Steele and redistributing her duties to 
other Pelmor employees—regardless of who those particular employees were—is entirely 
consistent with Pelmor’s claim that Steele’s position was eliminated as part of an effort to 
reduce costs.  
Third, Steele cites a minor inaccuracy in Wuensche’s testimony as evidence of 
pretext. During his deposition, Wuensche said that he was unsure of the exact date he 
first learned that Steele’s gender discrimination suit had been dismissed. When prodded 
for an answer, he testified that he learned of the dismissal more than thirty days before 
Pelmor terminated Steele’s employment. This was inaccurate because Steele’s gender 
                                              
5 Steele also argues that Ross’s testimony that he did not remember seeing the March 
2015 memo raises a genuine question as to the memo’s authenticity. However, regardless 
of whether Ross saw the memo, the evidence shows that he had considered eliminating 
the production manager position to lower costs before Steele’s employment was 
terminated. See A.247 (May 15, 2015 email from Wuensche to Ross with restructuring 
proposals); A.249 (May 26, 2015 email from Ross to Wuensche authorizing elimination 
of the production manager position). 
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discrimination suit was dismissed exactly thirty days before Pelmor terminated Steele’s 
employment. 
Steele argues that this inaccuracy “casts serious doubt on [Wuensche’s] credibility 
as to other matters[.]” Br. for Appellant at 25. However, “[d]iscrepancies or inconsistent 
prior statements do not, as a matter of law, render a witness’s testimony incredible.” 
United States v. Hernandez, 544 F.3d 743, 747 (7th Cir. 2008). Furthermore, “the 
mistakes that witnesses make in all innocence must be distinguished from slips that . . . 
show that the witness is a liar or his memory completely unreliable.” Ren v. Holder, 648 
F.3d 1079, 1087 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Kadia v. Gonzalez, 501 F.3d 817, 822 (7th Cir. 
2007)). Nothing in the record suggests that Wuensche intentionally distorted the truth. 
Rather, he acknowledged that he could not remember the exact date he learned of the 
dismissal. Then, when pressed by plaintiff’s counsel, he made a good faith attempt to 
estimate the date, and his estimate was one day off. This is an innocent mistake, and it is 
not sufficient to render his testimony as a whole incredible.  
Finally, Steele argues that Pelmor’s failure to produce performance-related emails 
from every single month of 2014—after Pelmor alleged that it had sent Steele emails 
“once or twice a month” in 2014— is evidence of pretext.  While the record does not 
contain performance-related emails from every month in 2014, it contains a total of 
twelve performance-related emails sent to Steele throughout the course of the year: three 
emails from January; three from March; one from May; two from July; one from August; 
one from October; and one from November. Twelve performance-related emails over the 
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course of a year is entirely consistent with Pelmor’s claim that it fired Steele in part 
because of her poor job performance.  
 Even when considered together, the timing of Steele’s termination and the four 
minor inconsistencies she points to are not sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to 
conclude that Pelmor’s proffered explanation for Steele’s termination was pretext for 
retaliation. In fact, Pelmor produced ample evidence to the contrary. The evidence 
indicates that the restructuring plan was a legitimate attempt to reduce overhead and 
improve efficiency: Steele’s responsibilities were absorbed by existing employees, 
Pelmor did not hire a new production manager, and it implemented at least one of the 
other restructuring measures proposed by Wuensche. Steele’s unsatisfactory job 
performance was also well-documented.  Before she even filed her discrimination 
lawsuit, she had received an unsatisfactory performance review and several emails 
advising her of performance issues. There is simply no evidence to support a finding that 
Steele was terminated in retaliation for filing a discrimination lawsuit. We will therefore 
affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on Steele’s Title VII and PHRA 
claims.  
B. Pennsylvania Wrongful Discharge Claim 
We will affirm the District Court’s order granting summary judgment on Steele’s 
wrongful discharge claim for the same reason. Pennsylvania recognizes a cause of action 
for terminating an employee in retaliation for filing a worker’s compensation claim. Shick 
v. Shirey, 716 A.2d 1231, 1237 (Pa. 1998). Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
has not articulated the elements of a wrongful discharge claim, the Third Circuit analyzes 
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such claims using the same McDonnell Douglas framework used to analyze Title VII and 
PHRA claims. Theriault v. Dollar Gen., 336 F. App’x 172, 175 (3d Cir. 2009). 
Therefore, the absence of a showing of pretext dooms Steele’s wrongful discharge claim 
as well.  
IV. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s order granting summary 
judgment on all claims. 
